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Artificial-Noise Alignment for Secure
Multicast using Multiple Antennas
Ashish Khist and Dongye Zhang
Abstract—We propose an artificial-noise alignment
scheme for multicasting a common-confidential message
to a group of receivers. Our scheme transmits a su-
perposition of information and noise symbols. The noise
symbols are aligned at each legitimate receiver and hence
the information symbols can be decoded. In contrast, the
noise symbols completely mask the information symbols
at the eavesdroppers. Our proposed scheme does not
require the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel
gains at the transmitter for alignment, yet it achieves
the best-known lower bound on the secure degrees of
freedom. Our scheme is also a natural generalization
of the approach of transmitting artificial noise in the
null-space of the legitimate receiver’s channel, previously
proposed in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple antennas provide a promising approach for
enhancing confidentiality of messages at the physical
layer. A natural technique using multiple antennas is
artificial-noise transmission [1]. We transmit an infor-
mation message by beamforming in the direction of the
legitimate receiver and superimpose a noise signal in
a direction orthogonal to the legitimate receiver. This
way any eavesdropper, whose channel vector has a
component along the noise vector gets jammed by the
noise signal. Unfortunately, such an approach does not
scale when we need to multicast a common message to
a large number of legitimate receivers. If the number
of receivers is larger than the number of transmit
antennas, we cannot find a vector that is simultaneously
in the null space of all receivers. The main purpose
of this note is to show that in such situations, one
can transmit a superposition of signal and noise. If the
transmitter has M antennas, one should align the noise
symbols at each legitimate receiver so that together
they occupy only 1
M
degrees of freedom, and the
information symbols can occupy the remaining 1− 1
M
degrees of freedom.
In related works, the multi-antenna compound wire-
tap channel was introduced in [2] where a common
message needs to be transmitted to a group of legiti-
mate receivers and needs to be kept confidential from
a group of eavesdroppers. An interference alignment
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scheme for this setup was proposed in [3]. The in-
terference alignment scheme in [3] however requires
knowledge of the eavesdropper channel gains. Using
the real-interference alignment approach in [4]–[6], it
aligns the information symbols at each eavesdropping
receiver so that they only occupy 1
M
degrees of free-
dom at each eavesdropper. In contrast, our proposed
scheme only requires knowledge of the channel gains
of the legitimate receivers for alignment, yet achieves
the same degrees of freedom as in [3].
II. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a compound multi-antenna wiretap
channel that consists of one transmitter with M an-
tennas, and a group of J1 legitimate receivers, each
with one antenna, and a group of J2 eavesdroppers
each with one antenna. The resulting channel model
can be expressed as
yj = h
T
j x+ vj , j = 1, . . . , J1
zk = g
T
k x+ wk, k = 1, . . . , J2,
(1)
where the transmitted signal vector x ∈ RM is required
to satisfy the average power constraint E[||x||2] ≤ P ,
and the additive noise variables vj and wk are in-
dependent identically distributed (i.i.d) AWGN noise
variables, distributed N (0, 1). In our model we assume
that all the elements of the vectors hj ,gk ∈ RM are
rationally independent; such a condition is satisfied
with probability 1 if the channel gains are sampled
independently from any continuous valued distribution.
We will assume that the channel gains hj of the legit-
imate receivers are perfectly known to the transmitter.
The channel gains gk are not known to the transmitter.
However when selecting the rate of the code, we will
assume that an upper bound
max
k
||gk||
2 ≤ c (2)
is known to the transmitter. Furthermore, we only
consider the case that the channel coefficients remain
fixed for the entire duration of communication.
We transmit a single common message w to all the
J1 legitimate receivers. A rate R is achievable if there
exists a sequence of length n wiretap codes such that
the error probability at each legitimate receiver goes to
zero as n → ∞ and the leakage rate 1
n
I(w ; znk ) also
approaches zero as n→∞ for each k = 1, . . . , J2. Of
2particular interest is the achievable degrees of freedom
i.e., d = limP→∞ R1
2 log2 P
. As remarked earlier, the
result in [3] assumes a complete knowledge of channel
gains of the eavesdropper and proposes a signal align-
ment scheme that achieves d = 1− 1
M
. Our main result
is that the same degrees of freedom can be achieved
using a noise alignment scheme that aligns artificial-
noise in the direction of legitimate receivers. Such a
scheme has the advantage that it does not need any
information about the eavesdropper’s channel in the
alignment process.
Proposition 1: An achievable degree-of-freedom for
the compound multi-antenna wiretap channel with M
transmit antennas, where the channel gains of the
legitimate receivers are perfectly known, whereas the
channel gains of the eavesdropper are not known,
except for c (c.f. (2)), is given by d = (1− 1
M
)
.
III. ARTIFICIAL-NOISE ALIGNMENT
Our transmission scheme consists of sending ficti-
tious (noise) messages in addition to the information
message w . Through an appropriate choice of a pre-
coder, we align the noise symbols at each legitimate
receiver while the noise symbols are not aligned at
any eavesdropper. This enables the legitimate receiver
to decode the information message, whereas it is
completely masked by the fictitious messages at the
eavesdropper.
We begin by defining the precoding sets as follows.
Let N be a sufficiently large integer and let
T =


J1∏
j=1
M∏
i=1
h
αji
ji
∣∣ αji ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}

 , (3)
A =


J1∏
j=1
M∏
i=1
h
αji
ji
∣∣ αji ∈ {0, . . . , N}

 , (4)
where hji denotes the channel gain between the i-
th transmitter antenna and the j-th legitimate re-
ceiver. Note that each selection of the tuple {αji} ∈
{0, . . . , N−1}MJ1 results in a different element of T .
There are a total of L = NMJ1 elements in T , and
L′ = (N +1)MJ1 elements in A. Let v ∈ RL consists
of all elements in the set T , and let
V =


vT 0 · · · 0
0 vT · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · vT

 ∈ RM×ML. (5)
We let our signal constellation be
C = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (6)
where the value of a and Q will be defined in the
sequel. We let the transmit vector be given as
x = u(αTb1) + V b2 (7)
where b1 ∈ CKL is the vector of information symbols
and b2 ∈ CML is the vector of fictitious noise symbols.
All the symbols are uniformly distributed over C.
Furthermore u ∈ RM and α ∈ RKL are vectors
whose elements are mutually independent and also
independent of all the elements in hji. The output at
each legitimate receiver can be expressed as
yj = h
T
j uα
Tb1 + h
T
j V b2 + vj , j = 1, . . . , J1.
(8)
Let hˆj =
(
hTj uα
T
)T
, so that hˆj ∈ RKL. Notice
that the elements of hˆj are rationally independent and
independent of the elements in A. We let
h˜Tj = h
T
j V =
[
hj1v
T , . . . , hjMv
T
]
. (9)
Thus, h˜j is a length ML vector whose elements belong
to the set A in (4). Since all elements of h˜j belong to
A we can also express it as [3, Lemma 2]
h˜Tj = h˜
TTj, (10)
where h˜ ∈ RL′ is a vector consisting of all the
elements in A and Tj ∈ RL
′×ML is a matrix for which
every column has exactly one element that equals 1,
and the remaining elements are zero. Furthermore no
more than M entries in each row of T are non-zero.
The output at each legitimate receiver can be simplified
as
yj = hˆ
T
j b1 + h˜
TTjb2 + vj , j = 1, . . . , J1 (11)
Note that the elements of hˆj and h˜ are rationally
independent. The output at each eavesdropper can be
expressed as
zk = (g
T
k u)α
Tb1+g
T
k V b2+wk, k = 1, . . . , J2.
(12)
We let
g˜Tk = g
T
k V =
[
gk1v
T , . . . , gkMv
T
]
. (13)
Eq. (12) then reduces to
zk = gˆ
T
k b1 + g˜
T
k b2 + wk, k = 1, . . . , J2. (14)
where gˆk =
(
gTk uα
T
)T
∈ RKL.
Since the elements of u, α, hj and gk are rationally
independent, it follows that all the elements of gˆk and
g˜k are rationally independent.
In the next section, we develop an expression for an
achievable rate for the proposed coding scheme and
propose the value for K that maximizes the degrees of
freedom.
IV. SECRECY RATE
Since the elements of the vectors hˆj ∈ RKL and h˜ ∈
R
L′ in (11) are rationally independent, an appropriate
3scaling of constellation parameters exist that achieves
the rate close to capacity. In particular we select
Q = P
1−ε
2(KL+L′+ε) , a = γ
P
1
2
Q
(15)
where γ2 = 1
M(||hˆj ||2+||h˜||2)
is a normalizing constant
which only depends on the channel gains and pre-
defined u and α. An achievable secrecy rate for the
compound wiretap channel model is [2]
R = max
pb1,x
{
min
j
I(b1; yj)−max
k
I(b1; zk)
}
. (16)
To compute (16) we note that
I(b1; yj)−I(b1; zk) = H(b1)−H(b1|yj)−I(b1; zk)
(17)
and bound each of the three terms. Since all elements
of b1 ∈ RKL are uniformly distributed over the
constellation C it follows that
H(b1) = KL log2(2Q+ 1) ≥
1
2
KL(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
log2 P
(18)
Next since the vectors hˆj ∈ RKL and h˜ ∈ RL
′
in (11) consist of rationally independent channel gains,
we have (c.f. [3]) that the error probability at legitimate
receivers
Pr(e) ≤ exp (−ηP ε) = oP (1), (19)
where η > 0 that depends on channel gains but does
not depend on P and oP (1) → 0 as P → ∞. Thus
from Fano’s inequality we have,
H(b1|yj) ≤ 1 + Pr(e)H(b1)
= 1 + Pr(e)KL log2(2Q+ 1)
= 1 + oP (1) log2 P. (20)
Note that since the channel gains in g˜k are rationally
independent, b2 can be decoded with high probability
from g˜Tk b2 + wk on the condition that
KL+ L′ ≥ML. (21)
Hence, we have
I(b1; zk) = I(b1,b2; zk)− I(b2; zk|b1)
= I(x; zk)−H(b2) +H(b2|zk,b1)
= I(x; zk)−H(b2) + oP (1) (22)
≤
1
2
log2(cP + 1)−H(b2) + oP (1) (23)
≤
1
2
log2(cP + 1)−
1
2
ML(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
log2 P + oP (1)
(24)
where (22) follows based on the condition (21)
and (23) follows from the fact that I(x; zk) ≤
log
(
1 + ||gk||2P
)
≤ log(1 + cP ) where c is defined
in (2). Substitute (18), (20) and (24) into (17), we can
achieve the lower bond on the secrecy rate
R = I(b1; yj)− I(b1; zk)
= H(b1)−H(b1|yj)− I(b1; zk)
≥
1
2
KL(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
log2 P − (1 + oP (1) log2 P )−(
1
2
log2(cP + 1)−
1
2
ML(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
log2 P + oP (1)
)
≥
1
2
(
(K +M)L(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
− 1− oP (1)
)
log2 P
Finally, we have the secure degree of freedom (d.o.f)
d = lim
P→∞
R
1
2 logP
=
(K +M)L(1− ε)
KL+ L′ + ε
− 1 (25)
We need to select K to maximize d given the
constraint in (21). We select
K = M −
L′
L
= M −
NMJ1
(N + 1)MJ1
(26)
By selecting N sufficiently large, K → M − 1 and
ε can be selected to be sufficiently close to zero, the
secure d.o.f in (25) can be made arbitrarily close to
1− 1
M
.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose the use of artificial-noise alignment
for transmitting a confidential message using a multi-
antenna transmitter. The proposed scheme transmits
a superposition of information and noise symbols. It
simultaneously aligns the noise symbols at all intended
users so that the message symbols can be decoded
by these receivers. In contrast, the message symbols
are completely masked by noise symbols at the eaves-
droppers. Our alignment scheme does not require the
knowledge of eavesdropper channel gains and the
codebook construction only requires a bound on the
SNR of the eavesdroppers.
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